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BEYOND INVALIDATION:
THE JUDICIAL POWER TO ZONE
ROBERT J. HARTMAN*
INTRODUCTION
Recent decisions redefining the limits of municipal zoning authority
have stimulated vigorous legal commentary on the nature and pro-
priety of exclusionary zoning devices., Commentators have consistently
condemned zoning practices designed to exclude certain groups from
a community. Despite increasing recognition that exclusionary zoning
in a community presents serious problems, few viable remedies have
appeared to combat its ill effects. The absence of curative legislation
places responsibility for redress of the wrongs inherent in exclusion-
ary zoning with the judiciary. Yet courts have usually abstained
or have provided ineffective relief when faced with an exclusionary
ordinance. The victims of exclusionary zoning are thus left without
a remedy, while municipalities are encouraged to continue exclusion-
ary practices.
A court has three options for resolving an exclusionary zoning case:
it can uphold the municipal zoning scheme; it can invalidate the
scheme and remand the matter for municipal reconsideration; or it
can invalidate the scheme and provide affirmative relief to the injured
parties. This Note focuses upon the affirmative remedies courts have
employed when an ordinance is held exclusionary and hence invalid.
*B.A., University of Minnesota, 1972; J.D., Washington University, 1975.
1. For extensive bibliographies of the recent commentaries see Township of
Williston v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 7 Pa. Commw. 453, 463-64 n.3, 300 A.2d 107,
112 n.3 (1973); Symposium: Exclusionary Zoning, 22 SYRAcusE L. Rzv. 465, 627
(1971). The most frequently employed exclusionary devices are large-lot zoning,
e.g., Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972);
Queen Anne's County v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d 450 (1967); Appeal
of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); National Land &
Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Appeals, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597
(1965); Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390
(1959), and apartment exclusion, e.g., Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank v. Village of
Mount Prospect, 22 11. 2d 463, 177 N.E.2d 365 (1961); Fanale v. Borough of
Hasbrouk Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d 749 (1958); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa.
237. 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
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It will analyze the cases in which courts have sought to provide
effective relief and will discuss the problems these decisions raise.
Finally, the Note will consider municipal defenses to judicial incur-
sion into the field of zoning.
I. TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES
Zoning litigation traditionally involves three parties: the land-
owner/developer who desires to make the most economically profit-
able use of his property; the neighbor who wants to maintain the
neighborhood status quo; and the municipality, which zones and
serves as the protector of the public interest. An additional interest,
however, has also been recognized:
A zoning by-law cannot be adopted for the purpose of setting
up a barrier against the influx of thrifty and respectable citizens
who desire to live there and who are able and willing to erect
homes upon lots upon which fair and reasonable restrictions
have been imposed nor for the purpose of protecting the large
estates that are already located in the district. The strictly local
interests of the town must yield if it appears that they are plainly
in conflict with the general interests of the public at large.2
If the public at large has a protectable interest, any party excluded
from a community should have standing to bring an action to in-
validate the offending ordinance. The traditional rule, however, is
that standing is afforded only to an "aggrieved person,"3 one who
suffers "a pecuniary impact upon some property interest by way of
the zoning enactment."4 Thus in all states except New Jerseyu the
2. Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 565-66, 42 N.E.2d 516, 519
(1942) (dictum).
3. See, e.g., Moskowitz, Standing of Future Residents in Exclusionary Zoning
Cases, 6 AKRON L. REv. 189 (1973); Comment, Standing to Appeal Zoning
Determinations: The "Aggrieved Person" Requirement, 64 MbCH. L. REv. 1070
(1966); Note, The Responsibility of Local Zoning Authorities to Nonresident
Indigents, 23 STAN. L. REV. 774, 795-97 (1971); Note, Extending Standing to
Nonresidents-A Response to the Exclusionary Effects of Zoning Fragmentation,
24 VAND. L. REV. 341, 354-60 (1970). See also 3 R. ANDERSON, Tim AeRI-
CAN LAW OF ZONING § 21.05 (1968).
4. Feiler, Zoning: A Guide to Judicial Review, 47 J. URBAN L. 319, 324 (1970).
5. N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 55-47.1 (Supp. 1973) gives standing to "other
interested parties" to attack zoning ordinances, thus encompassing persons ex-
cluded from the community by a particular zoning scheme. See Oakwood at
Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (L.
Div. 1971), on remand, 128 N.J. Super. 438, 320 A.2d 223 (L. Div. 1974). It has
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rights of excluded persons can be vindicated only by the landowner/
developer.
A developer desiring to build in a restricted community faces the
strong presumption of validity accorded all zoning legislation as well
as the traditional judicial deference to the municipal prerogative.6
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 7 the Supreme Court estab-
lished two legal principles that provide the basis for the municipal
zoning power: separation of uses, including the exclusion of apartments
from single-family residential zones, is a legitimate use of municipal
authority;" the municipality's decision will not be upset by a court if
tle question presented is fairly debatable. 9 These principles have al-
lowed municipal discrimination against apartments and judicial defer-
ence to such discrimination. When a court finds, however, that the de-
veloper has proved that an ordinance or its application is arbitrary or
unreasonable, it can either invalidate the ordinance and return the mat-
ter to the municipality, or grant the developer some measure of affirma-
tixe relief. Reliance upon the municipality to correct the exclusionary
effect has proven ineffective. In Appeal of Girsh'0 a property owner had
unsuccessfully sought municipal approval to build apartments on
his land. The Pennsylvania supreme court held that a zoning ordi-
nance that makes no provision for apartments was an unconstitutional
prohibition of free entry into a community. A remarkable series of
events followed the invalidation of the ordinance: (1) the township
re/oned to create an apartment district that did not, however,
been suggested that the statute may have been unwittingly passed without consid-
eration of its potential impact. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1970, § 8, at 9, col. 1. The
issue of standing for non-residents in exclusionary zoning cases was recently decided
by the United States Supreme Court. Warth v. Selden, 43 U.S.L.W. 4906 (U.S.
June 25, 1975) (standing denied).
6. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); see Note,
Remozin,, the Bar of Exclusionary Zoning to a Decent Home, 32 OHIo ST. L.J.
373 (1971), for an argument against the presumption of validity for exclusion-
ary zoning ordinances.
7. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
8. Id. at 394-95; see Babcock & Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apart-
ment Boon, Ill U. PA. L. REv. 1040, 1091 (1964), for a criticism of the
continuing validity of the distinction between apartments and detached dwellings
for zoning purposes.
9. 272 U.S. at 388. It has been suggested that the fairly debatable rule has no
independent significance but is merely a tool in enunciating the court's reasoning
when the equities are balanced in favor of the zoning authority. Scott, Judicial
Reuiew of Zoning Decisions in Illinois, 50 ILL. B.J. 228, 235 (1971).
10. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
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encompass plaintiff's property; (2) plaintiff brought an unsuccessful
mandamus action against the building permit officer to compel permit
issuance; (3) the municipality announced plans to condemn plain-
tiff's property for a public park; (4) plaintiff sued to prevent the
condemnation and to challenge the dilatory tactics of the munici-
pality. Finally, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ordered that
building permits be issued."' Nonetheless, after five years of contin-
uous litigation, the property remains undeveloped. The area's economy
has so changed that it has become unprofitable for the landowner to
develop his property at the zoning density for which he originally
applied.12
II. NEw APPROACHES
Although the Pennsylvania court expressed concern over a munici-
pality's ability to exclude certain groups by preventing the construc-
tion of suitable housing, the court's decisions do not remedy the
problem. To avoid the Girsh scenario, the court could have enjoined
the municipality from preventing the desired development. A recent
line of Florida decisions demonstrates the utility of such injunctions. 3
In Burritt v. Harris4 the property owner was repeatedly denied
11. Order No. MP-12, 271 (Aug. 29, 1972); Krasnowiecki, Zoning Litiga.
tion and the New Pennsylvania Procedures, 120 U. PA. L. Rtv. 1029, 1080-82 &
n.202a (1972) [hereinafter cited as Krasnowiecki]; accord, Casey v. Zoning Hear-
ing Bd .............. Pa .. 328 A.2d 464 (1974).
12. Address by Professor Jan Krasnowiecki, Washington University School of
Law, Feb. 27, 1974. See also Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466,
268 A.2d 765 (1970), in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania invalidated
two and three acre minimum lot requirements. The municipality thereafter
subjected the property to subdivision, sewer, water and site planning restrictions
that have effectively prohibited development of the property. Address, supra.
In National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Appeals, 419 Pa.
504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965), the court invalidated a four acre minimum lot size
requirement in a residential district, yet did not grant the requested building
permits. The township subsequently "threatened to rezone to three acre minimum
lot sizes, reading the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decree narrowly as affecting
only four acre minimum lot sizes. Rather than face another protracted court
battle, National Land settled the dispute by accepting a two acre minimum lot
size." Krasnowiecki, supra note 11, at 1080. Twelve years after the original
action commenced, Appeal of Nat'l Land & Inv. Co. (No. 1), 11 Ches. Co.
436 (Pa. C.P. 1963), the property in question remains undeveloped. Address,
supra.
13. The Florida cases discussed in the text do not involve questions of ex-
clusionary zoning. They are significant in their approach to the scope of judicial
authority in zoning matters generally.
14. 172 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1965).
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rezoning even though he requested a classification consistent with
surrounding uses. The Florida supreme court held:
It is not the function of a court to rezone property, but, the facts
and circumstances of this case considered, it is our function to
determine at what point zoning restrictions become arbitrary.
The evidence having conclusively shown the petitioner's property
to be unfit for residential purpose, it is our view that petitioner's
rights should be settled here by holding the respondents are re-
quired to rezone petitioner's property to a classification not more
restrictive than industrial "A" [the classification requested by
petitioner].15
A later case refined the Burritt rule, holding that while the trial
court may not direct a rezoning, it may enjoin enforcement of any
classification more restrictive than that requested by the landowner.' 6
While Burritt appears to be the general rule in Florida,17 recent
15. Id. at 823.
16. City of Miami Beach v. Weiss, 217 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1969). For a general
discussion of litigation techniques under the Weiss doctrine see Memorandum from
Daniel R. Mandelker to Walter Beckham entitled Availability of Specific Relief
in Florida Zoning Cases, June 8, 1971 (on file with Urban Law Annual).
17. E.g., Stokes v. City of Jacksonville, 276 So. 2d 200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1973); Dade County v. Moore, 266 So. 2d 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); City
of Miami v. Schutte, 262 So. 2d 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); City of South
Miami v. Martin Bros., 222 So. 2d 775 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Prestige
Homes of Tampa, Inc. v. City of Hillsborough, 220 So. 2d 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1969); accord, Daraban v. Township of Redford, 383 Mich. 497, 176
N.W.2d 598 (1970).
The Virginia supreme court recently adopted a modified version of the Florida
approach. In City of Richmond v. Randall . ....... Va  ........., 211 S.E.2d 56
(1975), the trial court held a challenged ordinance invalid and ordered the City
Council either to enact a new zoning classification for the property that would
allow construction of the proposed building, or to enact the specific permit ordi-
nance proposed by the landowner and sponsored by the planning commission. The
supreme court agreed that the ordinance was invalid but held that the trial
court's first order transgressed the legislative prerogative, and the second order,
by foreclosing the council's right to amend the permit ordinance and impose
conditions upon the requested use, infringed upon legislative discretion. Id. at
.... , 211 S.E.2d at 61-62. The court suspended the adjudications of invalidity
for a prescribed period of time and remanded the cause to the City Council for
further legislative action:
Since City made no showing of an alternative reasonable use, the new decree
will enjoin Council during that period from taking any action which would
disallow the one use shown by the record to be reasonable, subject to Coun-
cil's right under its charter to amend a permit ordinance and impose reason-
able conditions not inconsistent with such use. The new decree will further
provide that if Council fails to comply within the time prescribed, the
Washington University Open Scholarship
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intermediate court decisions depart from the limited interpretation
of the rule. When an ordinance is held invalid, these later decisions
permit a trial court to direct a rezoning in accordance with the
landowner's request.' 8 In other words, the courts need not merely
rely upon an injunction against enforcement of a particular classi-
fication. Such holdings bring these lower Florida courts in line with
the Illinois rule of judicial review in zoning matters.
Illinois permits a trial court, upon finding an ordinance to be
invalid, to order the municipality to permit the requested use.'9
This approach prevents further litigation by preventing the local
governmental body from simply rezoning to another classification
that still denies the landowner's proposed use. Furthermore, the
landowner may not proceed with a use other than the one the court
considered reasonable when it invalidated the ordinance.20
adjudications of invalidity will become operative and the injunction will
become permanent, provided that landowners shall not put their property
to any use other than the use shown by the record to be reasonable.
Id. at ........ , 211 S.E.2d at 62 (emphasis added); accord, Board of Supervisors
v. Allman -. ....... Va ......... , 211 S.E.2d 48 (1975). Emphasis is added to the
Randall holding to remind the reader of the potential abuse that may arise from
a municipality's imposition of added conditions for development. See note 12
supra.
18. See Davis v. Situs, Inc., 275 So. 2d 600 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973);
Board of County Comm'rs v. Soto, 259 So. 2d 196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 267 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1972); William Murray Builders, Inc. v. City of
Jacksonville, 254 So. 2d 364, 367 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), cert. denied, 261
So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1972): "We therefore hold that the zoning regulation in
question . . . isn't fairly debatable . . . . Appellant's property should be rezoned
for apartment use in accordance with the appellant's application, a use which
is consistent with the surrounding areas and circumstances." Cf. City of Miami v.
Saussele, 239 So. 2d 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970). Contra, Board of County
Comm'rs v. Ralston, 284 So. 2d 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); City of
Miami Beach v. Breitbart, 280 So. 2d 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). Ralston
and Breitbart rejected both judicial power to rezone and the power to establish
a minimum restriction as authorized in Burritt and Weiss.
19. Franklin v. Village of Franklin Park, 19 Ill. 2d 381, 167 N.E.2d 195
(1960); Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Richton Park, 19 Ill. 2d 370, 167 N.E.2d 406
(1960).
20. Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Richton Park, 19 Ill. 2d 370, 378-79, 167 N.E.2d
406, 411 (1960). Fiore v. City of Highland Park, 93 Ill. App. 2d 24, 235 N.E.2d
23 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1084 (1969), upheld the Illinois judicial re-
zoning remedy. Plaintiff sought to build apartments in a single-family zone.
During litigation the City rezoned the property to an office and research zone.
The trial court held this classification too restrictive and hence invalid. The
court also held the original single-family classification invalid, but since this
question was no longer in controversy, the appellate court reversed this determi-
nation. The City rezoned back to the single-family classification and the trial
[Vol. 9:15;9
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Although the Florida and Illinois approaches to judicially fashioned
remedies in zoning litigation provide effective and efficient methods
for rapidly concluding such disputes, both leave two difficult ques-
Lions unanswered. First, does judicial fashioning of affirmative relief
in zoning litigation invade the legislative sphere? Secondly, should
such judicial relief be applied universally or selectively?
Most courts have indicated that zoning is a legislative function
and refuse to sit as super-zoning boards,21 thus taking a firm position
on the separation of powers issue. On the other hand, courts that
have granted affirmative relief to a property owner have failed to
address this issue directly. One court skirted the problem by claim-
ing that granting the property owner's requested classification is
analogous to a writ of mandamus. -2 Another suggested that a point
court again held it invalid and ordered that plaintiff be permitted to build
apartmcnts. The City appealed on the ground that the Sinclair Pipe Line Co.
doctrine constituted judicial usurpation of legislative powers. Affirming the
decision below, the court of appeals stated:
We have the utmost respect and deep regard for the philosophy embodied
in the principle of separation of powers of the three branches of government.
However, a City which is an appellant in zoning litigation, cannot parlay the
doctrine of separation of powers into an authorization to exercise its delegated
legislative powers after the case is decided adversely to it and remanded to
the trial court with directions, and void the opinion and mandate of the
reieri~ng court ...
93 Ill. App. 2d at 33, 235 N.E.2d at 27-28. For recent decisions affirming the pro-
priety of Sinclair Pipe Line Co. see First Nat'l Bank of Skokie v. Village of Mor-
ton Grove, 12 11. App. 3d 589. 299 N.E.2d 570 (1973); Chicago Title & Trust
Co v. County of Du Page, 12 111. App. 3d 386, 298 N.E.2d 259 (1973); Bass v.
City of Joliet, 10 Ill. App. 3d 860, 295 N.E.2d 53 (1973); Kraegel v. Village of
Wood Dale, 10 I11. App. 3d 486, 294 N.E.2d 64 (1973); LaSalle Natl Bank v.
City of Chicago, 130 Ill. App. 2d 457, 264 N.E.2d 799 (1970). City of Rich-
mond v. Randall . ....... Va ......... , 211 S.E.2d 56 (1975), adopted a modified
Florida approach to judicial remedies, see note 17 supra, and rejected the position
developed in Sinclair Pipe Line Co.: "We believe these holdings, which compel
affirmative action by legislative bodies, go too far. The injunction is a more
traditional remedy and one less offensive to the concept of separation of powers."
Id. at ........ , 211 S.E.2d at 61 n.3.
21. See, e.g., COME v. Chancey, 289 Ala. 555, 269 So. 2d 88 (1972); Shel-
burne v. Buck, 240 A.2d 757 (Del. 1968); City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470
S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971); Bow & Arrow Manor, Inc. v. Town of West Orange,
63 N.J, 335, 307 A.2d 563 (1973); Boggs v. Board of Supervisors, 211 Va.
488, 178 S.E.2d 508 (1971).
22. Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Richton Park, 19 Ill. 2d 370, 379, 167 N.E.2d
406, 411 (1960). This analogy is contested on the ground that mandamus is
not appropriate to compel a zoning decision properly committed to legislative
discretion. Krasnowiecki, supra note 11, at 1062-63; accord, 3 R. ANDERSON,
supra note 3, at 22.06 and cases cited therein. See also Curry v. Young, 285
Minn. 387, 173 N.W.2d 410 (1969).
1975]
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exists beyond which the separation of powers doctrine will not pro-
tect a municipality's legislative power to zone.28
One commentator argues that a distinction should be drawn be-
tween affirmative relief being granted to a landowner who appeals
a variance denia2 4 and a case in which an ordinance is held uncon-
stitutional.25 In the former, once the claimant establishes a hardship,
he is only entitled to the minimum departure from the ordinance
necessary to remove the hardship and not necessarily to permission
for the proposed use. In the latter case, the municipality may liber-
alize its ordinance while litigation is pending as to its constitutionality
and, failing to do so, cannot complain when the proposed use is
ordered by the court.20 Others suggest that no separation of powers
issue arises when a court grants a landowner relief by ordering a
zoning reclassification since local governments are not the type of
legislative bodies entitled to judicial deference .27 In summation, it
appears courts will employ the separation of powers rationale as a
tool to refuse affirmative relief to plaintiffs who successfully challenge
an ordinance. Yet a court that does grant affirmative relief will
either ignore the separation of powers issue,28 emphasize practical
23. Fiore v. City of Highland Park, 93 Ill. App. 2d 24, 235 N.E.2d 23 (1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1084 (1969) ; see first quotation in note 20 supra. See also
City of Richmond v. Randall . ....... Va ......... , 211 S.E.2d 56 (1975), which
stated that zoning is a legislative function:
But when the evidence shows that the existing zoning ordinance is invalid
produces no evidence that an alternative reasonable use exists, then no legis-
lative options exist and a court decree enjoining the legislative body from
taking any action which would disallow the use shown to be reasonable is
not judicial usurpation of the legislative prerogative.
Id. at ........ , 211 S.E.2d at 61 (footnote omitted).
24. A variance is an authorization to construct a building that is prohibited
by the zoning ordinance. "A variance is granted to render justice in unique and
individual cases of practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship resulting from
a literal application of the zoning ordinance." 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at§ 14.02.
25. Krasnowiecki, supra note 11, at 1059-64.
26. Id.
27. Cohn & Hyman, Daraban-Round Three, 51 MICH. ST. B.J. 80, 82-83
(1972).
28. See, e.g., Davis v. Situs, Inc., 275 So. 2d 600 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973);
Board of County Comnm'rs v. Soto, 259 So. 2d 196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 267 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1972).
[Vol. 9:169
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considerations necessitating the remedy,29 or assert that the relief is
within the scope of the court's equitable powers.30
The second question-whether the judicial power to fashion affirm-
ative remedies in zoning cases should be uniformly or only selectively
employed-is the more difficult. Whenever a zoning ordinance is
challenged, the property owner inevitably argues that the restriction
operates to deprive him of the developmental value of his land.
Allegations that a zoning ordinance is exclusionary, however, are
less frequent. The injurious effects of an exclusionary restriction
reach beyond the developer/landowner by depriving excluded groups
of access to the community. Since judicial zoning is clearly an in-
cursion on the municipal prerogative, arguably the power should
be exercised in only the latter, more extreme situation. Yet, as the
Florida and Illinois cases indicate, this is not what has in fact oc-
curred.31
Few courts have held ordinances exclusionary and fewer still have
fashioned affirmative relief. While the remedies employed by the
Florida and Illinois courts are available in all zoning matters, they
have yet to be applied in an exclusionary context. Other examples
of judicially imposed remedies in cases holding a zoning ordinance
invalid include ordering issuance of building permits, 32 requiring
a municipality to plan for adequate housing to meet regional needs, 33
and, in an extreme case, requesting court appointed planners to rezone
an area within a community3 4 The factors that persuade a court to
provide an affirmative remedy include the good or bad faith of the mu-
nicipality, and the urgency of municipal and regional housing needs.3 5
29. See text at notes 19-20 supra.
30. See note 56 infra.
31. See note 13 supra.
32. See text at note 11 supra; Township of Williston v. Chesterdale Farms,
Inc., 7 Pa. Commw. 453, 300 A.2d 107 (1973).
33. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 119
N.J. Super. 164, 290 A.2d 465 (L. Div.), aff'd, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975)
(municipality's duty to plan for housing extended beyond "local" needs to its
"fair share of the regional burden").
34. Pascack Ass'n v. Mayor & Council, 131 N.J. Super. 195, 329 A.2d 89
(L. Div. 1974).
35. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 119
N.J. Super. 164, 290 A.2d 465 (L. Div.), aff'd, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, (1975);
Pascack Ass'n v. Mayor & Council, 131 N.J. Super. 195, 329 A.2d 89 (L. Div.
1974); Township of Williston v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 7 Pa. Commw. 453,
300 A.2d 107 (1973).
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In Township of Williston v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc.3 6 plaintiff,
encouraged by the Pennsylvania supreme court's decision in Girsh,37
alleged that an ordinance, which failed to provide for apartments,
was invalid. While the action was pending, the Township amended
the ordinance to permit apartment classification in a limited area
by special exception.3 1 Since the new district did not include plain-
tiff's land, it again sued to have the ordinance declared invalid.
The court held the ordinance unconstitutional, both before and
after the amendment, concluding that the Township had failed to
assume its "fair share" of the regional burden to meet the housing
shortage.39 The court considered the amended ordinance an inade-
quate response to the area-wide housing problem, noting that "(1) the
requirements for construction of apartments are such that only high-cost,
low density units can feasibly be constructed; and (2) the ground
area zoned for apartment use is effectively so small in relation to the
township as to be a mere token in response to the mandate of Girsh."4o
Recognizing the futility of merely invalidating the ordinance and
sending the matter back to the local government for resolution,41
the court ordered the Township to grant plaintiff the necessary
building permit to complete the apartment complex as planned.
The form of relief chosen was expeditious, conclusive and sanctioned
by the Pennsylvania supreme court in its clarification of Girsh.42
Furthermore, in a recent revision of zoning appeal procedures, the
state legislature has specifically authorized the relief granted by the
court.
43
36. 7 Pa. Commw. 453, 300 A.2d 107 (1973). Cf. Ellick v. Board of Super-
visors ................. Pa  Commw. ................, 333 A.2d 239 (1975) (successful chal-
lenge to ordinance which failed to provide for town houses).
37. See text at notes 10-11 supra.
38. A special exception will be granted without a showing of hardship upon
satisfaction of conditions prescribed in the ordinance. 2 R. ANDMRSON, supra
note 3, at § 14.03.
39. Township of Williston v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 7 Pa. Commw. 453,
468-70, 300 A.2d 107, 115-16 (1973).
40. Id. at 473, 300 A.2d at 117.
41. "In the process of remedying the constitutional flaw, the local decision-
making machinery will again respond to the political pressures which caused the
original ordinance to exclude apartments." Id. at 481, 300 A.2d at 121, quoting
Washburn, Apartments in the Suburbs: In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 74 Dicy.
L. REV. 634, 656 (1971).
42. See text at note 11 supra.
43. PA. SrAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011 (1972):
(1) In a zoning appeal the court shall have power to declare any ordinance
or map invalid and to set aside or modify any action, decision or order of
[Vol. 9:159
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol9/iss1/7
JUDICIAL POWER TO ZONE
Although a court-ordered building permit is an efficient means of
implementing a zoning decision, it is also a highly visible judicial
incursion into the municipal prerogative. Since only Pennsylvania
authorizes such judicial power, other courts have attacked the im-
plementation problem by other means.
In Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laureld a lower New Jersey court dealt with a municipality's re-
luctance to provide housing for its low-income residents. The chal-
lenged zoning ordinance had no provision for moderate- and low-
priced apartments. The poor were left with a choice between living
in shanties and abandoning the town. The local government's sole
concern was with "those development plans which will provide direct
and substantial benefits to our taxpayers" rather than with the needs
of lower-income citizens.4 , Finding no valid justification for the
ordinance," the court concluded that the duty "to promote the
general welfare'" 7 transcended the private welfare of those in control
of municipal government. Utilizing a technique employed in federal
desegregation decisions,"s the court ordered the municipality to under-
the governing body, agency or officer of the municipality, brought up on appeal.
(2) If the court finds that an ordinance or map or a decision or order
thereunder which has been brouaht up for review unlawfully prevents or
restricts a development or use N hich has been described by the landowner
through plans and other materials submitted to the governing body, agency
or, fficer of the municipality whose action or failure to act is in question on
appeal, it may order the described development or use approved as to all
eleme7ts or it may order it approved as to some elements ....
(Emphasis added). But ef. Ellick v. Board of Supervisors. ................ Pa  Commw.
.............. 333 A.2d 239 (1975) (narrow reading of provision regarding acceptable
grouinds for judicial intervention).
4t. 119. N.J. Super. 164, 290 A.2d 463 (L. Div.), aff'd, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d
713 (1975).
45. Id. at 170, 290 A.2d at 468.
46. Id. at 176, 290 A.2d at 472:
Today, when municipalities give reasons for the exclusion of certain uses,
although they gloss them ith high-meaning phrases, they lack sincerity. It
is not low-cost housing wx hich ferments crime; it is the lower economic strata
of society which moves in, yet no ordinance would dare raise that objection
to prohibit them and expect to succeed. Local legislative bodies know better
than to state that more lowx -income producing structures will mean a higher
tax rate.
See 8 URBAx L. AN. 193, 203-04 (1974).
47. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-32 (1967) ; see 26 RuTGERs L. REv. 401 (1973).
48. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) ;
Bradley v. Milliken, 434 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd and remanded, 94 S.
Ct. 3112 (1974); Gautreaux v. City of Chicago, 480 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1973),
CerL denied, 414 U.S. 1144 (1974); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286
(1971), a/I'd in part, rev'd in part per curiam, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972)
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take a study of the local and "regional" need for low- and middle-
income housing. Upon completion of the study, the Township was
ordered to implement an affirmative housing program based upon a
plan that met with court approval. While a court-ordered study per-
mits municipalities to retain their planning and zoning authority
within judicially defined limits, it may also permit them to evade their
court-ordered responsibility by excessive delay.
III. JUDICIALLY IMPOSED ZONING
A recent decision has introduced a new planning approach. After
an exclusionary ordinance is found invalid the court, not the
municipality, develops and orders the implementation of a remedial
plan. The zoning ordinance of the Township of Washington, New
Jersey, an exclusive area of expensive homes, had no provision for
apartments. When a developer purchased a 30 acre tract, the Town-
ship responded by increasing his minimum lot size requirement from
10,000 square feet to two acres and then denied the developer a vari-
ance for apartments. In Pascack Association v. Mayor & Council o
plaintiff-developer challenged both the denial of a variance and the
ordinance's constitutionality in that it failed to permit construction
of multi-family housing at a time when such housing was in great
demand both locally and regionally.50 Noting the local and regional
housing shortage and the high price of homes in the community,"1
the court invalidated the ordinance. By failing to provide suitable
housing for the low- and middle-income segment of the area's popu-
(en banc); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aft'd, 457 F.2d
788 (5th Cir. 1972).
49. 131 N.J. Super. 195, 329 A.2d 89 (L. Div. 1974). Pascack is a culmina-
tion of three earlier unpublished opinions from the bench cited as Pascack I (Dec.
20, 1972) (initial invalidation of the municipal zoning ordinance); Pascack 11
(Oct. 4, 1973) (court appointment of planning consultants); Pascack III (Jan.
25, 1974) (hearing on consultant's recommendation). (Opinions on file with
Urban Law Annual.)
50. See Williams & Norman, Exclusionary Land Use Controls: The Case of
North-Eastern New Jersey, 22 S'apacus, L. REv. 475 (1971), for an excellent em-
pirical analysis of the housing shortage and potential of four northeastern New
Jersey counties. Bergen County, which includes Washington Township, is located
in the area but was excluded from the study because it was already highly de-
veloped. Id. at 479 & n.10.
51. Pascack 1, supra note 49, at 12. The average market value of a house
in Washington Township was $40,000, requiring a minimum down payment of
$8,000 and an annual income of $19,000 to meet bank standards for a mortgage
loan.
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lation, the Township had failed in its statutory obligation to promote
the general welfare.52
Following this decision, the Township amended its ordinance and
established a 34 acre apartment district. 53 Only five acres, however,
were suitable for apartments, and plaintiff's tract was not included in
the rezoning.5 4 Plaintiff complained that the amendment did not
comply with the court order because it precluded apartment con-
struction and was therefore inconsistent with local and regional
economic needs.
The Pascack court, which had retained continuing jurisdiction,55
concluded that the Township had acted in bad faith and announced
that it would appoint planning consultants to recommend a com-
52. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-32 (1967). The court rejected the township's
conclusion that plaintiff had not met his statutory obligation necessary for a
variance. Id. §§ 40:55-39(c), (d) provide that a variance from the zoning
classification shall be granted not only upon a showing of "undue hardship," see
note 24 supra, but also for a "special reason." The "special reason" for a
variance in an exclusionary zoning context appeared first in De Simone v.
Greater Englewood Housing Corp. No. 1, 56 N.J. 428, 267 A.2d 31 (1970).
There, a non-profit housing sponsor obtained a variance to build low- and
moderate-income apartments in a single-family district. Neighbors in the dis-
trict claimed no "special reason" existed for granting the variance, and the
New Jersey supreme court held "as a matter of law in light of public policy
that public or, as here, semi-public housing accommodations to provide
safe, sanitary, and decent housing, to relieve and replace substandard living
conditions or to furnish housing for minority or underprivileged segments of the
population outside of ghetto areas is a special reason adequate to meet [the
statutory] requirement." Id. at 442, 267 A.2d at 38-39.
See Note, The New Jersey Judiciary's Response to Exclusionary Zoning, 25 RuT-
GERS L. REv. 172, 179 (1971), which suggests that De Simone will have a negli-
gible effect on proposed privately developed multi-family housing because the court's
express reference to the need for public and semi-public housing accommodations
as a special reason for a variance is susceptible of a narrow reading. The Pascack
court, however, found the "special reason" requirement satisfied when privately-
financed rental housing for the middle-class was proposed in an area of critical
housing shortages. Pascack I, supra note 49, at 25-26; accord, Brunetti v. Mayor
& Council, 130 N.J. Super. 164 . ........ , 325 A.2d 851, 853 (L. Div. 1974).
53. Township of Washington, N.J., Ordinance No. 73-1, Jan. 29, 1973.
54. Id. The amended ordinance also imposed restrictions on density, minimum
floor area, and the permissible number of bedrooms per unit.
55. The Florida courts are also authorized to retain jurisdiction to assure
municipal compliance with their zoning decisions. City of Miami Beach v. Weiss,
217 So. 2d 836, 838 (Fla. 1969); Memorandum, supra note 16, at 4.
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munity zoning plan.5 6 The consultants57 thereafter recommended
rezoning plaintiff's property for apartment use subject to certain
regulations and controls.58 At a hearing on the merits of the con-
sultants' proposal, plaintiff's experts testified that apartments built
at 15 to 17 units to the acre would provide housing at affordable
rents.59 Plaintiff's experts argued that any density lower than 15
units per acre would increase the developer's costs and result in
prohibitively expensive apartments. The court nevertheless relied
upon the consultants' expertise and adopted their recommended
density of nine units per acre.60
56. The court reluctantly granted this remedy citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962), and the racial desegregation decisions, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), and Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S.
294 (1955), as precedents for invoking this equitable authority. It appreciated
that courts should not have to resolve zoning disputes in this manner, "but
where someone . . . is suffering as a result of the abdication of . . . [municipal]
responsibility, the Court has no alternative but to carry it out." Pascack II,
supra note 49, at 22.
It appears that one of the appointed consultants, Professor Jerome Rose of
Rutgers, also had mixed reactions to the advisability of judicial intervention in
the zoning field. Citing recent federal and state cases in which courts have taken
an active role in developing an exclusive community into a socially balanced commu-
nity, e.g., Gautreaux v. City of Chicago, 480 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1973) cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1144 (1974); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (1971), afl'd in
part, reo'd in part per curiam, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (en bane) ; Crow v.
Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972);
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 119 N.J. Super.
164, 290 A.2d 465 (L. Div.), cert. granted, 62 N.J. 190, 299 A.2d 724 (1972), Rose
viewed the traditional judicial role as changing to one in which "courts . . .
have undertaken the delicate and difficult task of maintaining community balance
that the legislatures have been reluctant to accept. This is an unfortunate develop-
ment because the nature of the problem is one that is best resolved by the kinds
of political negotiation and compromise upon which a democratic legislative
process is based." Rose, The Courts and the Balanced Community: Recent
Trends in New Jersey Zoning Law, 39 J. Am. INST. PLANNERS 265, 274 (1973).
Rose also agreed with the Pascack court, however, that when the legislature abdi-
cates its responsibility, the courts must step in and fill the void. Id.
57. Professors Jerome Rose and Melvin Levin of Rutgers.
58. The consultants recommended, inter alla, a maximum density of nine units
per acre as applied to plaintiff's property. Compare this recommendation with
the contested municipal ordinance, which permitted up to fifteen units to the
acre. Township of Washington, N.J., Ordinance No. 73-1, Jan. 29, 1973. Recall,
however, that the ordinance limited property suitable for apartments to five acres
or 75 total units. The consultant's density recommendation affected all of plain-
tiff's 30 acres for a total of 270 units.
59. Pascack III, supra note 49, at 56-77.
60. Pascack Ass'n v. Mayor & Council, 131 N.J. Super. 195 . ........, 329 A.2d
89, 97 (L. Div. 1974).
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The conclusion reached in Pascack was unsatisfactory to all parties.
Plaintiff claimed it could not build economically under the nine unit
per acre density. Nor was the Township pleased that two zoning
ordinances had been invalidated and a third imposed upon it by the
court.
Pascack, however, can provide a valuable lesson in implementing
judicial decisions that invalidate exclusionary zoning. Use of a
planning consultant provides a compromise between two extreme
positions determined solely by considerations of self-interest. The
developer seeks maximum profits. Excluded groups seek a place
to live. Both unquestioningly support local housing development.
Fearing uncontrolled growth and a rising tax rate,r5 the municipality
opposes any such development. Therefore, only a neutral planner
can view the entire situation fairly and provide a solution that meets
the needs of each group. Furthermore, the use of expert consultants
meets the criticism that courts lack the planning expertise to enter
the zoning field. Although utilization of the expert planner to
fashion judicial remedies for exclusionary zoning is only a partial
solution, it can provide a means for the rational introduction of
multi-family housing into exclusively residential communities.
61. New Jersey state government does little to help municipalities finance local
scnices. In 1969, for instance, New Jersey ranked 41st in state aid for municipal
education. It is suggested that this forces municipalities toward "fiscal zoning,"
i.e. using land controls to attract good ratables and discourage bad ratables, such as
low-income housing. Williams & Norman, supra note 50, at 477 & n.6. See also
Williams, The Three Systems of Land Use Control, 25 J. URBAN L. 80 (1970).
It has also been suggested that "fiscal zoning" has actually backfired on the
municipalities:
In practice, the attempted cure of financial problems by using the zoning
p,,wer, designed to regulate, for the purposes of exclusion is disastrous. First
of all, the zoning power, not designed as a fiscal device actually becomes
self-detructive when applied to taxes. Since property taxes are based on
market value, the limitation of land available for high-density residential
development in the face of demand for such development can do nothing
but drive up the prices. An attempt to reduce taxes by creating a land
shortage will in most cases, have just the opposite effect.
Mezey, Bey'ond Exclusionary Zoning-A Practitioners View of the New Zoning,
5 URBAN LAW. 56, 63 (1973). A recent study proposes that exclusionary zoning
is not fiscally motivated and that increased state aid to education would have
a negligible effect on the concentration of the inner city poor. Branfman, Cohen
& Trubek, Measuring the Intisible W1all: Land Use Controls and the Residential
Patterns of the Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 483, 484, 501-02 (1973). But cf. Ruvoldt,
Educational Financing in New Jersey: Robinson v. Cahill and Beyond, 5 SETON
HALL L. REv. 1, 20-25 (1973).
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IV. MUNICIPAL RESPONSE TO JUDICIAL ZONING
As the limited number of zoning cases in which affirmative judicial
relief is employed indicates, very few courts favor this solution. Fifty
years of judicial deference to municipal autonomy in zoning and
planning is difficult to overcome. In addition, the threat of judicial
interference has caused municipalities to develop various defensive
measures.
Among the more popular evasionary tactics are municipal plans
to control growth, voter referendums to approve public housing, and
environmental defenses. Controlled growth plans have met with
mixed success in the courts. The New York high court upheld a
plan to control growth by phasing the extension of municipal services
within the community over an 18 year period02 Development would
be permitted only when the extension of service facilities was im-
minent, thus allowing the community effectively to prevent develop-
ment, in some areas, for up to 18 years.63 A federal district court,
however, recently invalidated a plan that limited the number of
building permits for new housing each year to one-quarter of the
annual growth rate.64 The court found that the plan violated the
constitutional right of non-residents to travel into the community.05
62. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138,
appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972) (4-3 decision).
63. Responding to the assertion that the zoning ordinance created by the plan
fostered localism and was exclusionary, the court stated that,
far from being exclusionary, the present amendments merely seek, by the
implementation of sequential development and timed growth, to provide a
balanced cohesive community dedicated to the efficient use of land. The
restrictions conform to the community's considered land use policies as ex-
pressed in its comprehensive plan and represent a bona fide effort to maxi-
mize population density consistent with orderly growth.
30 N.Y.2d at 378, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152. Commentators have
both praised and criticized this decision. Compare Bosselman, Can the Town of
Ramapo Pass a Law to Bind the Rights of the Whole World?, 1 FLA. ST. L.
REv. 234 (1973), with Elliot & Marcus, From Euclid to Ramapo: New Directions
in Land Development Controls, 1 HOFSTRA L. Ray. 56 (1973), and Note, Phased
Zoning: Regulation of the Tempo and Sequence of Land Development, 26 STAN.
L. Rv. 585 (1974).
64. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D.
Cal. 1974), order stayed pending appeal, 5 ENVIRONMENTAL RPTR., No. 14, at
429 (1974) (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1974).
65. 375 F. Supp. at 581-86. Interstate travel is a "fundamental" constitutional
right and can be abrogated or limited only for a compelling state reason. Memorial
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Clearly, a court must attempt to draw the line between legitimate
land use planning and illegitimate exclusionary schemes. 66
An additional device that has successfully inhibited judicial inter-
ference in zoning matters is the municipal referendum. The refer-
endum procedure permits municipal voters to reject a zoning board's
decision to allow subsidized public or semi-public housing and appears
all but immune from judicial interference. 7 The justification for
referendums-providing the electorate with a voice in decisions affect-
ing the future development of their own community-has precluded
judicial inquiry into the municipal motive for the referendum.68
Environmental justifications may also be raised to avoid judicial
invalidation of an exclusionary ordinance. In one instance, imme-
diately after a developer had purchased local property, the town
rezoned to an excessively large minimum lot size requirement. 9 The
town argued that the proposed development would cause immeasur-
able ecological harm.70 The Second Circuit reluctantly upheld the
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 258 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); cf.
Village of Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974), in which the Court
found no violation of the right to travel in a zoning scheme that prohibited
more than two unrelated persons from sharing a dwelling in the community.
See 8 URBAN L. ANN. 193, 198-99 (1974). The Petaluma plan was designed
primarily to prevent rapid growth caused by its proximity to San Francisco, yet
the court did not distinguish between interstate and intrastate travel. Accord,
King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir.
1971); Cole v. Housing Authority, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970).
66. Local governments may also assert that they are in the process of com-
pleting a comprehensive growth plan thereby delaying a final decision on their
exclusionary zoning scheme. See Zelvin v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 30 Conn. Supp.
157, 306 A.2d 151 (C.P. Hartford County 1973).
67. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Southern Alameda Spanish
Speaking Organization v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970);
Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969); Queen Creek Land &
Cattle Corp. v. Yavapai County Bd. of Supervisors, 108 Ariz. 449, 501 P.2d
391 (1972); Lefcoe, The Public Housing Referendum Case, Zoning, and the
Supreme Court, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 1384 (1971). But see Smith v. Township of
Livingston, 106 N.J. Super. 444, 256 A.2d 85 (Ch. Div. 1969). The referendum
technique is not, however, limited to subsidized housing. In a recent referendum
the voters of Boulder, Colorado, endorsed a resolution directing the city govern-
ment to curb the municipal growth rate pending the completion of a definitive
examination of the city's growth capabilities, thereby adding the planned growth
defense to its referendum. 60 Gzo. L.J. 1363 (1972).
68. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141, 143 (1971).
69. Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972).
70. Id. at 960.
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ordinance, affording the municipality and its environmental concerns
the benefit of the doubt.71
While municipal defense mechanisms may not conclusively preclude
judicial invalidation of an exclusionary zoning ordinance, they may
weigh heavily in a court's final decision. Comprehensive planning, voter
referendums, and environmental protection are valid concerns and
responsibilities implicit in municipal land use programs. While these
concerns deserve recognition, they should not provide absolute pro-
tection for an ordinance designed to exclude unwanted groups from
a community. Yet in attempting to resolve this conflict fairly, a court
faces the difficult task of discerning the municipal motive. The key
to municipal defense techniques is that they inject more substantive
issues into zoning litigation that the developer must disprove and
the court must disbelieve. The burden is on the challenger. These
mechanisms enhance the possibility that the challenged ordinance will
withstand attack and hence avoid imposition of affirmative judicial
relief.
CONCLUSION
Mere judicial invalidation of an exclusionary ordinance provides
no relief to persons excluded from the community. Courts that in-
validate an ordinance and return the matter for municipal resolution
can expect only delay and evasion. On the other hand, courts that
provide an affirmative solution to exclusionary zoning face the claim
of judicial usurpation of the legislative function. In addition, courts
are forced to consider increasingly persuasive municipal defenses to
exclusionary zoning schemes.
Courts should not be compelled to resolve the problems created
by exclusionary zoning.72 Permanent solutions to the problem lie in
71. On reviewing the record, we have serious worries whether the basic moti-
vation . . . was not simply to keep outsiders . . . out of the town .... But,
at this time of uncertainty as to the right balance between ecological and
population pressures, we cannot help but feel that the town's ordinance,
which severely restricts development, may stand for the present as a legitimate
stop-gap measure.
Id. at 962. See also Confederacion de ]a Raza Unida v. City of Morgan Hill,
324 F. Supp. 895 (N.D. Cal. 1971), for a successful environmental defense to
prevent a low-income housing project.
72. See Note, Toward Improved Housing Opportunities: A New Direction lor
Zoning Law, 121 U. PA. L. Rv. 330 (1972).
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a regional, as opposed to a local, concept of land usage.73 Until this
solution is accepted, however, the judiciary must carry the remedial
burden: 74 "We can say that the judicial branch .. .is powerless to
grant any relief [in this area]. But if we are powerless to grant
relief in the zoning field, then we ought to get out of the zoning
field altogether and . . . decide [no] zoning cases."75 Because courts
do in fact decide exclusionary zoning cases, they should provide
remedies that successfully conclude the litigation and protect the
substantive rights involved.7
73. See, e.g., Becker, Municipal Boundaries and Zoning: Controlling Regional
Land Development, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 1; Haar, Regionalism and Realism in
Land Ue Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 515 (1957); Marcus, Exclusionary
Zoning: The Need for a Regional Planning Context, 16 N.Y.L.F. 732 (1970);
Walsh, Are Local Zoning Bodies Required by the Constitution to Consider
Regional Needs?, 3 CONN. L. REv. 244 (1971) ; Weinberg, Regional Land-Use
Control: Prerequisite for Rational Planning, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 786 (1971);
Comment, Exclusionary Land-Use Techniques: Judicial Response and Legislative
Initiative, 22 DE PAUL L. REV. 388 (1972); Note, Looking Beyond Municipal
Borders, 1965 WAsH. U.L.Q. 107; 71 YALE L.J. 720 (1962).
74. Until the problems of regionalism and parochialism are resolved, "the
courts will of necessity muddle unwillingly through the legislative void." Feiler,
Metropolitization and Land-Use Parochialism-Toward a Judicial Attitude, 69
MicH. L. REV. 655, 662 (1971).
75, Pascack II, supra note 49, at 18.
76. "When the property rights of an individual and the interests of the com-
munity collide, the conflict must be resolved. To expedite a full and final reso-
lution, a court confronted with the conflict must have the power not only to
adjudicate the dispute but also to order action not inconsistent with its adjudi-
cation." City of Richmond v. Randall ........ Va. ........., 211 S.E.2d 56, 61 (1975).
19751
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol9/iss1/7
